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SECURITIES REGULATION -
A CASE FOR APPLYING THE PROXY RULES TO SOLICITATIONS FOR
FUNDS IN CLASS ACTIONS BASED UPON THE
SECURITIES ACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Statement of the Problem
The objective of securities regulation is the protection of the public
and the investor from unfair and negligent practices involving investment
securities.1 Since Kardon,2 the achievement of this objective has been ef-
fected by private action as well as by the activities of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Moreover, the feasibility of private action in se-
curities litigation has been increased by the greater utilization of the class
action 3 The authors acknowledge the vital role of private action in se-
curities enforcement and the special import of the class action in realizing
this role; however, the following hypothetical situation demonstrates the
need for thoughtful consideration of the potential difficulties resulting
from the interaction between existing securities regulation and the class
action suit.
It is not difficult to imagine an investor who considers the hopeful un-
dertaking of a new company and, based upon an examination of the pro-
spectus, decides to invest in the company's new offering of registered se-
curities. The company, taking the capital obtained through the sale of
these securities, begins operations, but rapidly encounters difficulties and
is soon near bankruptcy. The investor, realizing the mistake of his in-
vestment, searches for a way to salvage the investment and determines
that the company's prospectus has misrepresented material facts. He then
proceeds to circularize fellow security holders, advocating his position and
seeking funds with which to prosecute a class action against the company.
Defense of the suit further dissipates the company's assets and thus, at a
minimum, reduces the liquidation value of the security to the security
holders. 4
1 This objective was characterized by the House Report on the Securities Acts Amendments
of 1964 as, "to protect the public and investors against malpractices in the securities and finan-
cial markets." H. R. REP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. CODE CONG. AD. NEWS 3013,
3016 (1964).
2 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
a The class action suit is based upon Federal Rule 23. For applications of the rule to Se-
curities actions see Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Green v. Wolf Corp.,
406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968); 44 N. DAME LAw. 984 (1969).
4 Typically the company would have indemnified its officers and directors who are the likely
targets of this type of action. Such indemnification is largely a matter of state law and is gen-
erally allowed. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13 (E) (Page Supp. 1971). There is
some question as to the validity of indemnification with regard to securities matters as being
against federal public policy, but there is apparently no question as to the reimbursement of ex-
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This brief hypothetical suggests the question to be discussed in this
note: Is a letter soliciting funds for a war chest to finance a class action
suit against a corporation a solicitation for a "consent" or an "authoriza-
tion" under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' and there-
fore subject to the federal proxy rules ?6 Since there are no decisions in
point, the conclusions reached are therefore not conclusions from author-
ity, but result from an examination of the theories underlying prior judi-
cial opinions and an expansive interpretation of the Congressional pur-
pose embodied in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.7  The authors con-
tend that the proxy rules should apply to such a solicitation, since the
federal securities laws were passed to insure investor protection in alf mat-
ters affecting security ownership. Application of the proxy rules in a
case such as this contributes to investor protection by insuring adequate
disclosure, continues the development of federal regulation consistent with
the regulatory purpose, and aids the courts in achieving judicial economy
and control in the prosecution of the class action.
B. The Definitional Problem-The Act and Commission Rules
Section 14(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a
national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit
or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or author-
ization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) reg-
istered pursuant to Section 781 of this tide.
The theory that the purview of the proxy rules is sufficiently wide to
include the solicitation of funds from security holders in a class action is
based upon the literal language of the definitions contained in Rule 14a-
18 and the judicial decisions defining words not defined by the proxy rules.
The term "proxy" is defined in Rule 14a-1 (d) as including "every proxy,
penses incurred by a director or officer in the successful defense of a suit. See J. W. JENNINGS &
H. MARSH, SEcuRIEs REGULATIoN 214-226 (1972). This reimbursement of expenses for
the defense of complicated and costly litigation might deplete the existing assets of the company
and reduce the liquidation value of the security. It is also possible, but a matter of speculation,
that the prosecution and defense of such a suit might adversely effect the market value of the se-
curity. This would likely depend upon such factors as the position of the company at the time
the suit was filed, whether the security was still being traded and its value at filing, and the ex-
tent and nature of publicity about the suit.
5 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970) [hereinafter "Section 14(a)"].
6 Our discussion will be directed to the case for applying the proxy rules to a letter from a
security holder soliciting funds to prosecute an action against a corporation, but the reader should
be aware that the same results would apply to any circularizing done by the corporation attempt-
ing to stifle such an action.
715 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970) [hereinafter "the Act"].
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 (1971).
[Vol. 34
NOTE
consent or authorization within the meaning of Section 14(a) of the Act.
The consent or authorization may take the form of failure to object or
dissent."'
Rule 14a-1 (f)'o defines "solicit" and "solicitation" to mean as follows:
(i) any request for a proxy whether or not accompanied by or included
in a form of proxy; (ii) any request to execute or not to execute, or to re-
voke, a proxy; or (iii) the furnishing of a form of proxy or other com-
munication to security holders under circumstances reasonably calculated
to result in the procurement, withholding, or revocation of a proxy.
The terms "consent" and "authorization" are not defined in the proxy
rules, but judicial decisions have adopted the definitions in Webster's Third
International Dictionary which states that an "authorization" is a "grant
or endowment of authority,"" and "consent" means "compliance [with]
or approval.. . of what is done or proposed by another... "12 These ex-
pansive definitions can be interpreted to include any solicitation for a
"grant of authority" or "approval" "in respect of any [registered] secu-
rity."13
The argument for finding that letters soliciting funds for class actions
are within the definitions here cited is that by soliciting funds for the pros-
ecution of a suit, the security holder is actually soliciting "consents" or
"authorizations" to represent other security holders in a suit "in respect of
... a [registered] security." While such a characterization of the letters
stretches the statutory language, this position appears tenable based upon
the statutory purpose embodied in the Act and the expansive language
employed by the judiciary in applying the statute. However, before re-
viewing the legislative history of the Act, an examination of the courts'
standards for statutory interpretation of the Securities Acts is necessary.
The Supreme Court set forth guidelines in SEC v. C.M. joiner Leasing
Co., 4 summarizing its position when it interpreted the definition of "secu-
rity" under the Securities Act of 193315 with the following language:
[C]ourts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its domi-
nating general purpose, will read text in light of context and will interpret
the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly permits so as to carry out
in particular cases the generally expressed legislative policy.16
The Court, discussing strict as compared to liberal construction of statutes,
9 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l(d) (1971).
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(f) (1971).
11 See, e.g., Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967).
12 See, e.g., Dunning v. Rafton, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
91,660 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
13 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
14 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
15 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
16320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943) (footnote omitted).
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concluded further that, although a penal statute should be strictly con-
strued, it should not be so strictly construed "as to narrow the words of
the statute to [exclude] ... cases which those words, in their ordinary ac-
ceptation, or in the sense in which the legislature has obviously used them,
would comprehend.'1 7  It is, therefore, within this context of statutory in-
terpretation that the legislative history of the Act and the judicial opinions
interpreting § 14(a) should be read.
II. CHARACTERIZATION AS AUTHORIZATION
A. The Purpose of the Act
As noted above, the paramount concern of the Congress in adopting
the Act was the protection of the public and the investor. A recognition
of the dependent position of the investor, apparent in the House Report, 8
underscores the necessity for such protection. Congress' acknowledgement
that the security holder must "have adequate knowledge as to the manner
in which his interests are being served" and that it is "essential that he be
enlightened not only as to the financial condition of the corporation, but
also as to the major questions of policy, which are decided at stockholders'
meetings,"' 9 emphasizes the need for disclosure to investors of informa-
tion relevant to their investment decisions.20
That Congress sought to protect the investor and adopted legislation
requiring full disclosure in order to advance that protection is obvious.
Moreover, it is submitted that the decision to leave the regulation of proxy
solicitations to the Commission implies a recognition that continued flexi-
bility is required to achieve the desired objectives.
There is, unfortunately, no discussion in the reports as to the meaning
or scope of "consent" or "authorization." At least one early article sug-
gests, however, that the terms were "intended to encompass situations such
as solicitations in reorganization proceedings ... to obtain authority to
'7Id. at 354. Although the court in Joiner was construing § 2(1) of the Securities Act of
1933 the same rules of statutory interpretation should apply to the '34 Act since the two acts
are in pari Inateria.
1 8 As a complex society so diffuses and differentiates the financial interest of the ordi-
nary citizen that he has to trust others and cannot personally watch the managers of all
his interests as one horse trader watches another, it becomes a condition of the very
stability of that society that its rules of law and of business practice recognize and pro-
tect that ordinary citizen's dependent position. Unless constant extension of the legal
conception of a fiduciary relationship--a guarantee of "straight shooting"--supports
the constant extension of mutual confidence which is the foundation of a maturing and
complicated economic system, easy liquidity of the resources in which wealth is invested
is a danger rather than a prop to the stability of that system. When everything every-
one owns can be sold at once, there must be confidence not to sell. Just in proportion
as it becomes more liquid and complicated, an economic system must become more
moderate, more honest, and more justifiably self-trusting.
H. R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1934).
'9S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1934).
2 0 See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
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represent the security holder .... ,,21 Agreeing with these authors, it is
submitted that the act was passed to insure the dissemination of adequate
information to security holders "in all those situations in which either the
corporate management or outside groups bargained with security holders
to affect the latter's rights." 22
B. Interpretations of the Range of Solicitations Subject
to the Proxy Rules.
While there has been surprisingly little litigation involving the defini-
tion of the word "proxy," cases have held that solicitations other than
direct solicitations of votes in corporate elections are within the meaning
of the term "proxy" and, therefore, subject to the rules. A review of these
cases reveals the presence of two related but still distinct questions: first,
the decision as to whether or not the communication at issue is, in fact,
a solicitation; second, the determination as to whether the sender actually
seeks a proxy, consent or authorization. This distinction is made because
a careful reading of the cases indicates that the judiciary has not consid-
ered the actual breadth of "consent or authorization" in § 14(a).
Beginning with Judge Learned Hand's opinion in SEC v. Okin,2 em-
phasis has been placed upon "solicitation" rather than "consent" or "au-
thorization." In Okin, Judge Hand declared that it "would be going too
far"24 to say that Okin's letter to shareholders asking them not to sign any
proxies for the company was a solicitation of a proxy, consent, power of
attorney, or authorization. 2" He went on, however, noting the defendant's
intention to follow up the letter with an actual solicitation of proxies, to
hold that the proxy rules applied to "any ... writings which are part of a
continuous plan ending in solicitation and which prepare the way for its
success."26 The assumption which is implicit in the Okin opinion is that
the terms "consent" and "authorization" are limited by the term "proxy"
to the traditional context of proxy use. While Judge Hand's approach has
been utilized by other courts27 and the SEC has changed its proxy rules to
conform to the decision,28 it is suggested that Okin should not be taken as
a limit on the scope of § 14(a).
2 1 Bernstein & Fisher, The Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies: Some Reflections on
Corporate Democracy, 7 U. Cm. L. REv. 226,231 (1940).
22 Id.
23 132 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1943).
24 Id. at 786.
2 5 The Okin decision involves Section 12(e) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act,
15 U.S.C. § 791(e) (1970), which is substantially similar to Section 14(a). See part II(C),
infra, for a more detailed comparison.
26 132 F.2d at 786.
2 7 See, e.g., SEC v. Topping, 85 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
2 8 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 5276, Jan 17, 1956, and E. ARANOW
& H. EwINHORN, PROXY CONTEsTs FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 87-92 (1957).
1973]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
In Dunning v. Rafton29 the court ruled that letters sent by the defen-
dants urging certificate holders of a voting trust to terminate the trust
were solicitations for a "consent" within § 14(a).30 The court stated that
it "did not consider the meaning of the word 'consent' in the Act to be
limited by the more specific term 'proxy' preceding it,"'" and then went on
to state that "the solicitation of consents would, according to common
usage, include any circularizations requesting or urging a security holder
to concur in or go along with the solicitor's proposals." 3
In Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon33 the court, after characterizing
the purpose of § 14(a) as "providing full and honest disclosure by those
who are seeking to maintain or gain control of a corporation through
solicitation of the corporate voting rights of shareholders," 34ruled that the
defendant's solicitations for memberships in a voting trust were solicita-
tions for "authorizations" under § 14(a). However, the court in no way
limited its definition of "authorization," recognizing it as "the grant
or endowment with authority. '35  Moreover, the court before accepting
this dictionary definition commented on the intended breadth of § 14(a):
While "proxy" is perhaps a narrow word of art implying an agency re-
lationship, the statute goes further. The words "consent" and "authoriza-
tion" are extremely broad words and are not limited by the word "proxy."
No doubt Congress intended that the words of the Act be given the broad-
est meaning necessary to effectuate its stated purposes. . . .By including
all of these words in the disjunctive, we believe Congress intended to
cover the entire field of solicitation for corporate control and all of the
various solicitation situations which might arise from time to time whether
conventional, novel, irregular or unorthodox. 36
Finally in Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin3 7 the court ruled that a stock-
holder's solicitations for authorizations to obtain inspection of the corpo-
29 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,660 (N.D. Cal. 1965) [1964-1966 Transfer Binder].
30 Id. at p. 95,437.
31 ld.
32 Id. This expansive interpretation of "consent" in Dunning is limited somewhat by the
literal language used by the court in discussing the purpose of the Act. The court cited SEC v.
May, 229 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1956) and concurred that the Act was promulgated "to protect the
investing public from misleading statements made in the course of a struggle for corporate con-
trol."
3 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967).
s4Id. at 795.
351d. at 796.
36 Id. The Greater Iowa court limited its opinion by saying that the statute should be inter-
preted as encompassing solicitations for membership in voting trusts in some circumstances and
that each case must be decided on an ad hoc basis. The court emphasized the defendant's intent
to secure corporate control and the literal language of the legislative history to conclude that the
statute should apply. The similarities between a proxy and membership in a voting trust made
such a conclusion a practical necessity if Section 14(a) were to retain any vitality.
37 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966).
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ration's stockholders list 8 were subject to § 14(a) and the proxy rules.
Judge Friendly stated:
The statute is worded about as broadly as possible, forbidding any per-
son "to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization" in respect of any se-
curity therein specified "in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors"; the definitions in Proxy Rules,
14a-1, exhaust the sweep of power thus conferred.89
This statement is dicta, however, since the court did not find it necessary to
go so far as to allow the injunction in the case presented to it. The solicita-
tions before the court were by a single shareholder requesting authoriza-
tion in a New York state court proceeding to obtain an inspection of the
shareholders list. The court was therefore able to rely on the more con-
servative theory expressed in SEC v. Okin,40 discussed above. Although
the precise holding by the court was that the defendant's letter was sub-
ject to the proxy rules because it was a part of a continuous plan intended
to end in solicitation of votes at a stockholders' meeting, the expansive
language quoted above was buttressed by a letter from the SEC which re-
lated the Commission's view regarding the proper breadth of the defini-
tion of "authorization":
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Commis-
sion's rules thereunder apply to any proxy, consent, [or] authorization and
are not limited to proxies, consents and authorizations in situations involv-
ing elections to office. There is no reason to suppose that Congress in-
tended that the protective provision of the proxy rules should not reach
other situations in which a stockholder is requested to permit another to
act for him, whatever may be the purpose of the authorization. 41
The failure (refusal) of the Gittlin court to consider directly the SEC's
expansive interpretation of the proxy rules has led one commentator to as-
sert that the practical effect will be to affirm the SEC position.'2 The va-
lidity of this prediction must await determination until more courts are
confronted with the necessity of construing the statutory language in ques-
38 It was necessary for Gittlin to secure authorization from an aggregate of five percent of
the corporation stock to comply with New York law:
Any resident of this state who shall have been a shareholder of record.., or any resi-
dent ... holding, or thereunto authorized in writing by the holders of, at least five
percent of any class of the outstanding shares .... may require such foreign corporation
to produce a record of its shareholders....
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1315(a) (McKinney 1963).
89 360 F.2d at 695.
40 132 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1943).
41 SEC v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 695 n.2 (2d Cir. 1966). For other indications that the
commission favors this position see H. FLOM, H. GARFINKEL & J. FREUND, DIScLOsURE
REQUIREMENTS OF PUBUC COMPANIEs AND INSMERS 82 (1967) and 4 L. LoSs, SEcURnEs
REGULATION 2841 (2d ed. Supp. 1966).
42 65 IRCH. L. REv. 582, 589 (1967).
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tion. In any event it is clear that, to date, the cases have uniformly in-
volved solicitations that either:
1) have as their goal the direct solicitation of votes, 43 or
2) have as their goal the kind of authorization which controls or
influences the votes of the security holders. 44
The precise holdings of these cases are consistent with a narrow reading
of the statutory language and a limited view of the legislative history.
However, the language employed by the courts in deciding these cases
has been much more expansive and, taken with the Act's general purpose
of protecting the investing public, supports the application of § 14(a)
to a solicitation in a class action.
C. Halsted v. SEC45
In Halsted, the defendant attempted to circularize stockholders of the
Long Island Lighting Company, a company in reorganization, to obtain
contributions to the fees and expenses of a shareholders' protection com-
mittee. The court there held that requests for such contributions were
solicitations for "authorizations" within the meaning of § 12(e) of the
Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935.46 After reviewing the
statutory provisions and their history, the court stated:
In the light of these provisions and their history, we think the Com-
mission was correct in finding that the proposed action in circularizing
stockholders amounted to soliciting an "authorization" within the mean-
ing of Section 12(e), and that it would or could produce "circumvention
of the provisions of this chapter or the rules, regulations, or orders there-
under" within the meaning of the same section. To construe the provi-
sions of Section 12(e) as covering only the solicitation of "any proxy,
power of attorney, consent, or authorization" in haec verba would defeat
the patent congressional intent to give the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission a needed measure of control over the relationships between the
stockholders and the persons who seek to represent them in reorganiza-
tion proceedings .... It cannot be questioned that a contribution of funds
could well make any prior right of representation more potent and effec-
tive. But more important, from the standpoint of investor protection, is
43 See, e.g., Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966).
44 See, e.g., Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967).
45 182 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
46 15 U.S.C. § 791(e) (1970). The language of Section 12(e), which is very similar to the
language of Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or to permit the use of his or its name
to solicit, by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce,
or otherwise, any proxy, power of attorney, consent, or authorization regarding any se-
curity of a registered holding company or a subsidiary company thereof in contravention
of such rules and regulations or orders as the Commission deems necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors or consumers or to pre-
vent the circumvention of the provisions of this chapter or the rules, regulations, or
orders thereunder.
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the fact that it binds the shareholder to the committee to which he has
contributed .... 47
The analogy between Halsted and a solicitation for funds in a class ac-
tion is dear and Halsted should be persuasive authority for the proposi-
tion that a solicitation letter of this nature is subject to the proxy rules
under § 14(a). There are, however, dissimilarities which cannot be over-
looked in relying on the reasoning in Halsted. The language in § 12(e)
of the 1935 Act48 is somewhat more expansive than that in § 14(a) and
the court, in Halsted, was relying in part on that more expansive language
to reach its conclusion. Section 12(e), as cited above, includes the lan-
guage:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to solicit . .. any ... authori-
zation ... in contravention of such rules . . . as the Commission deems
necessary ... to prevent the circumvention of the provisions of this chap-
ter or the rules, regulations, or orders thereunder.
To allow the solicitation of funds in this case would have been to allow cir-
cumvention of § 11(f) of the 1935 Act49 which gave the Commission con-
trol over the fees of a stockholders' protection committee. This element,
of course, distinguishes Halsted from the hypothetical case.
In dicta, the court also stated that the Commission's control over "the
proxies" under the '35 Act was more extensive than under the '34 Act.
The Securities and Exchange Commission had previously, in the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 ... been given power to supervise communi-
cations addressed to holders of securities registered under that Act where
proxies or similar authorizations were being solicited. . . . In the Public
Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, passed a year later, the Congress
gave the Commission broader powers over proxy solicitations than it had
been given in the 1934 Act.5
This explanation by the court in Halsted conflicts with the expansive lan-
guage found in dicta in the decisions cited above,5 but does not, however,
conflict with the direct holding of these cases. As a result, the application
of Halsted to the hypothetical situation herein must be with some cir-
cumspection.
D. Federal Civil Rule 23
Amended Federal Civil Rule 235' provides that when the statutory
47 Halsted v. SEC, 182 F.2d 660, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
4815 U.S.C. § 791(e) (1970).
49 15 U.S.C. § 79k(f) (1970).
50 182 F.2d 660, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1950). A comparison of the language of these sections
would so indicate; however, the legislative history of the '35 Act does not indicate that Congress
had this specific intention. See H.R. REP. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1935) and S.
REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 35 (1935).
51 See part II(B) supra.
52 FED. IL Civ. P. 23.
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conditions are met, "[olne or more members of a class may sue or be sued
as representative parties on behalf of all .... ." None of the conditions re-
quires the representative to obtain authorizations from other members
of the class.58
The characterization of this solicitation letter as an authorization may,
therefore, be less tenable than in similar situations, (e.g., the solicitation
of funds to prosecute a derivative suit) because in this case, as indicated
by the above cited rules, the security holder who is presently soliciting
funds may not need the authorizations to act in behalf of other securities
holders. Since the members of the class are determined by law, requests
for authorizations are unnecessary, thus the characterization of the letter
as a solicitation becomes less likely. This difficulty is arguably overcome,
however, if one considers such a case in its early stages, prior to a deter-
mination by the court, under Rule 23(c) (1) 54 as to whether the action is
to be maintained as a class action.5 5 At this point in the litigation two
arguments militate for the conclusion that the letter is a solicitation for
authorizations. (1) If the court were to determine that the action could
not be maintained as a class action, contributions received as a result of
the solicitation letter could be used to isolate those people who were
sympathetic to the action and who could be represented on an individual
basis.56 (2) If the court were to determine that the action could be main-
tained as a class action, the representations made in the solicitation letter
could have a material affect on the security holder's decision to "opt out"
under Rule 23 (c) (2). As such the letter can be viewed as a solicitation
for authority to represent the security holders' interest.5 8
Moreover, when letters are sent prior to the filing of an actual suit,
the argument for such characterization becomes more compelling. Prior
5 3 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1), (2):
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order
under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the
decision on the merits. (2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3),
the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude
him from the class if he so requests by a specific date; (B) the judgment, whether
favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C)
any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance
through his counsel.
54 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1).
55 In at least one case this determination was deferred for three years. See Block, Class and
Derivative Actions Under the Securities Laws, 26 Bus. LAW. 425, 432 (1970).
56 Cf. SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1943).
5 7 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2).
58 See Halsted v. SEC, 182 F.2d 660, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1950) : "It cannot be questioned that a
contribution of funds could well make any prior right of representation more potent and effective.
But more important... is the fact that it binds the shareholder to the committee to which he
has contributed."
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to filing there is no possibility for court supervision of the solicitations as
exists under the federal rules after filing 9 The need for regulation of
solicitations prior to judicial supervision under Rule 23 is implicit in the
American Law Institute's First Tentative Draft of the Federal Securities
Code.60 This draft suggests a prohibition on proxy solicitation substan-
tially like that of § 14(a). Besides, in listing the drafters' suggestions
to exemptions from the proxy rules the Code states:
(i) ...Section 602(b) to (h) inclusive [the prohibition against
solicitation] does not apply with respect to a solicitation or circularization.
(8) of security holders in a class or stockholders' derivative action if the
solicitation or circularization is under judicial supervision pursuant to a
Federal or State statute or rule .... 61
The inclusion of this exemption by the drafters of the model code is indic-
ative of the acknowledgement on their part that existing proxy regula-
tions currently apply to solicitations by any groups which "bargain with
security holders to affect . . . [their] rights."62 The exemption takes ac-
count of the fact that in a class action, once judicial supervision does attach,
the courts have discretion to control the action.' However, implicit in
the language chosen is the recognition that prior to the attachment of
judicial supervision, the proxy rules should apply to any solicitations in
class actions or derivative suits.
III. REMEDIES AND STANDING
A. Remedies
Throughout this article it has been assumed that the court would be
able to give relief by granting an injunction against further solicitations and
against the use of money obtained through solicitation in violation of the
proxy rules. It is now well settled that the courts have authority to grant
plastic remedies in cases of securities acts violations, to do whatever is
necessary to redress the damage proven." In a case such as this there is
little doubt that if it were established that solicitation letters are subject
59 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(d).
60 A..I., FEDERAL SECUmRTIES CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972).
61 A.L.I., FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 602(i) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972) (emphasis added).
62 Bernstein & Fisher, The Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies: Some Reflections on
Corporate Democracy, 7 U. Cm. L. REV. 226,231 (1940).
6sSee FED. R. CIrv. P.23(d). _
64 See, e.g., Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 790 (8th Cir. 1967): "And in
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 .. . (1946) the court reiterated 'And it is also well settled that
where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue
for such an invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong
done' ......
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to the proxy rules and that the movant has standing to complain of the
violation, injunction is a proper remedy.
3_. Standing
The SEC of course has standing to enforce the proxy rules65 and no
discussion of this point is necessary. It may be, however, that tactical
considerations would suggest the assertion of proxy violations by a party
other than the SEC. At least two other possibilities exist: 1) A security
holder who received the solicitation letter; and 2) the corporation.
1. The Security Holder.
A security holder who received the solicitation and who was a defen-
dant would be most likely to have standing to move for an injunction.
Two theories support this conclusion: first, there is a public interest in the
enforcement of the proxy rules, and second, this class of person can dem-
onstrate a potential injury to his interest. Such a defendant need not be
deceived by the solicitation to seek an injunction. The court, in Dann v.
Studebaker-Packard Corp." stated that:
These appellants do not specifically allege that they themselves were
misled by the appellees or that they gave appellees any proxies at all. As
we have noted above, the right sought to be protected by federal law is the
right of full and fair disclosure in corporate elections. . . .They could
suffer equally damaging injury to their corporate interests merely because
other shareholders were deceived in violation of federal law. Accord-
ingly, they should be entitled to protect themselves against such violations
to the same extent as if they, themselves, were the direct victims of the
unlawful deception. We are in an agreement with Professor Loss, of the
Harvard Law School, who ... said: "This question of standing has re-
ceived only the scantiest attention in the cases .... In principle it is dif-
ficult to see why there should be any limitation on this sort of private action
under Section 14(a). The remedy is based ... on the premise that either
side in a contested solicitation has a legitimate interest, in view of the
statutory purpose, to cry "foul" against the other ....6T
The Dann case is admittedly distinguishable from the instant case in
that it involves an action for violation of the proxy rules in a solicitation
for proxies to be used in a corporate election. At that election, there was
approved an "arrangement" between the defendant corporation and Cur-
tiss-Wright Corporation which resulted in a "waste and dissipation" of
Studebaker-Packard assets. Therefore, as noted above, the complainants
"suffered equally damaging injury to their corporate interest because
others were deceived in violation of federal law," and the value of their
6515 U.S.C. § 78u (1970).
66288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961).
67d. at 209.
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stockholdings fell because the arrangement described above had been ap-
proved at the corporate election.
The same argument is, however, equally applicable in this hypothetical
case. As a security holder in the company, one has an interest in its re-
organization or in the liquidation of its assets. The funding of a class
action may have a deleterious affect on that interest because the company
may be required to reimburse many of the defendants for expenses incurred
in the defense of that action; the remaining interest of the security holders
will therefore be substantially less."' Such damage should be sufficient to
cause the court to grant the relief sought because of the added public in-
terest factor in the enforcement of the proxy rules. Judge Friendly stated
as much in Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin6" when he said:
A plaintiff asking an injunction because of the defendant's violation of
a statute is not required to show that otherwise rigor mortis will set in forth-
with; all that "irreparable injury" means in this context is that unless an
injunction is granted the plaintiff will suffer harm which cannot be re-
paired.[ 70 At least that is enough where, as here, the only consequence
of an injunction is that the defendant must effect a compliance with the
statute which he ought to have done before. To be sure, time is of the
essence in proxy contests-at least the participants generally think it to be.
But the district court could properly have considered that the public
interest in enforcing the proxy rules outweighed any inconvenience to Git-
tin in having to start again. In this aspect decision rested in the judge's
sound discretion; we find no abuse.71
Certainly, the security holder who received the solicitation letter is within
the class of persons intended to be protected by these rules, since it was he
the solicitor was attempting to influence.
2. The Corporation.
Once the private right of action in securities regulation is recog-
nized,72 the conclusion that the corporation should also be able to bring an
action on its own behalf is apparent.7 3 Just as a stockholder is damaged
by the necessity of defending a frivolous class action, so too is the corpora-
tion as a whole. It is well established that the corporation possesses a ju-
68 See note 4 supra.
69360 F.2d 692 (2d cir. 1966).
7O It would seem that this is all "irreparable injury" ever means, but in this context it is
apparent that Judge Friendly intended to hold the plaintiff to a lower standard than is usually
applicable when an injunction is sought.
71360 F.2d 692, 698 (2d Cir. 1966).
72 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp.
512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
73See SEC v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966).
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ridical personality and to find against corporate standing would be wholly
illogical.74
IV. CONCLUSIONS
There is no doubt that the characterization of a letter soliciting funds
for the prosecution of a class action suit as the soliciting of an "authoriza-
tion" under § 14(a) of the Act is a close question. Certainly there is no
authority directly in point and the narrow holdings of the cases which
have constructed § 14(a) would not corroborate the conclusion. As the
above discussion has indicated, however, the language chosen by these
courts sustains the characterization. Moreover, focus on the "dominating
general purpose" 75 of the Act also bolsters the suggested result. Obvious-
ly in order for a court to hold such a solicitation to be within § 14(a), it
must resolve to underscore the broad intentions of the Act and employ an
expansive interpretation of the statute.
It is submitted that such a ruling is consistent with the authority cited
herein. The resolution of this question narrows to a choice between the
continued utilization of § 14(a) in only those situations in which solici-
tations were clearly directed to effecting "corporate action, ' 7 and the use
of the proxy rules whenever security holders are circularized with regard
to any rights relating to such securities. When one recognizes the increas-
ing complexity of security ownership and the expanding ownership of
securities, the latter direction is compelled. The enactors of the existing
securities laws recognized the essential need of protecting the investor but
could not conceivably allow for every potential abuse with explicit lan-
guage.
The class action device as it is now constituted in Rule 2317 is a useful
tool in securities regulation acknowledged as having a "therapeutic value"
in this field.7s The amended rule has gone a long way toward removing
the potential for abuse inherent in class actions. 9 However, there remains
an area in which this potential still exists.8° It is most reasonable that any
7 4 See 42 N. DAME LAW. 84 (1965) for a discussion of the development of standing for the
corporation.
75 SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350 (1943).
76 See Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1965): "In the absence of some
allegation of infringement upon corporate suffrage rights or some corporate action taken as a
result of such infringement no cause of action under Section 14(a) has been made out."
77 FED. R. CIrv. P. 23.
78See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
79 Id. at 486-87.
80 This potential for abuse has been recognized by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga-
tion:
The class action under Rule 23 is subject to abuse, intentional and inadvertent, un-
less procedures are devised and employed to anticipate abuse. Among the potential
abuses of the class action processes are the following: (1) solicitation of direct legal
representation of potential and actual class members who are not formal parties to
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security holder asked to contribute to the prosecution of a class action
should be adequately informed with regard to the suit. Not only are his
interests involved insofar as he contributes his funds to the action, but
the value of his securities may be affected by such a suit.
Application of the proxy rules to such a solicitation will accomplish
at least two things without imposing a substantial burden on the solicitor.
First, such a requirement should go far to insure that any communications
to security holders meet the requirements of full disclosure, and second,
such a requirement should substantially aid the courts in controlling these
actions once judicial supervision attaches. The notice requirements of
Rule 23, aimed at due process concerns8' rather than investor information,
make no certain contribution to investor knowledge. Imposing proxy rules
upon these solicitations and thus insuring that investors are informed will
serve as a significant hurdle to the filing of frivolous law suits, but will not
impede the use of the class action for meritorious claims. Moreover, it is
important to recognize that the application of proxy rules to these solicita-
tions would also lead to the same application to any company communica-
tions attempting to dissuade investors from the action, thus ensuring full
disclosure of information on both sides. Such a liberal recognition of the
SEC's power aids in the fulfillment of the regulatory purposes by giving
the SEC the necessary control over the relationship between stockholders
and those desiring to represent them. 82
Hugh R. Whiting
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the class action; (2) solicitation of funds and agreements to pay fees and expenses from
potential and actual class members who are not formal parties to the class action; (3)
solicitation by formal parties of requests by class members to opt out in class actions
under subparagraph (b)(3) of Rule 23; and (4) unauthorized direct or indirect com-
munications from counsel or a party, which may misrepresent the status, purposes and
effects of the action and of Court orders therein, may confuse actual and potential class
members, and create impressions which may reflect adversely on the Court or the ad-
ministration of justice. To anticipate and prevent these abuses timely action should be
taken by local rule or by orders in the particular civil action or by both.
In absence of some preventive action by the Court, formal parties to the action or
counsel for the formal parties may directly or indirectly, without knowledge or con-
sent of the Court, solicit from the potential or actual members of the class (or sub-
classes) who are not formal parties, funds for attorneys' fees and expenses, or agree-
ments to pay fees and expenses. The solicitation may be direct or indirect. To the
party solicited, solicitation may appear to be an authorized activity approved by the
Court, simply by reference to the title of the Court, the style of the action, the name of
the judge, and to official processes. Such unapproved solicitation may be of doubtful
ethical propriety and may result in well founded disatisfaction with the judicial man-
agement of the action.
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MuLTiDISTucr LITIGATION 48 (as revised May 18, 1970).
81 See Comment, Adequate Presentation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating
Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L REV. 889, 907-08 (1968).
8242 N. DAME LAW. 84 (1965).
1973]
